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Digitally mediated emotion: Simondon, affectivity and individuation 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the potential utility of framing emotion and digital activity as two 
strands of individuation (as opposed to distinct ontological entities). The concept of 
individuation is taken from the work of Gilbert Simondon, and facilitates a non-
deterministic reading of the relational/s between bodies and technologies. Core to 
individuation is affectivity, which does not define an individual emotional reaction to 
external stimuli but denotes a mode of being (as an individual) in relation to collectivity. 
This troubles understandings of how we distinguish between the individual and collective, 
with affectivity central to what Simondon defines as psychic individuation. The concepts of 
affectivity and individuation speak directly to the reality of living in concert with a 
seemingly ever increasing amount of digital media. We leave a continual informational 
trace, which can then ‘feed-forward’.1 into future patterns of collective activity. This 
informational activity has led some to define an ‘online self’ or ‘data double’.2 The chapter 
concludes by suggesting the concept of individuation as of greater value as it reconfigures 
thinking about the processes at work in body-technology relations, as it directs us “to know 
the individual through individuation rather than individuation through the individual".3 
 
 
Life as lines 
At the time of writing there is a UK NHS (national health service) public health campaign to 
promote vaccinations against the flu.  The campaign takes a hard-line stance, keenly 
communicating the dangers that the flu can present. Campaign posters include quotes such 
as “flu can kill”, and encourages all those who are able to be vaccinated for free to do so. The 
headline of campaign materials is “flu can mean the end of the line”, with an image of a 
heart rate monitor with the word flu embedded in it. Two things of interest are happening 
here. Firstly, an attempt to invoke fear amongst the general public as an act to motivate 
engagement with the vaccination program.  Secondly, utilisation of a simple yet effective 
metaphor for human life, namely the line. This defines life as linear and subject to 
continuous movement.  This speaks directly to the anthropologist Tim Ingold’s 
conceptualisation of life as lines.4 To think of life emerging as multiple intersecting lines is to 
frame it as not defined according to a set of inherent properties that remain relatively stable 
over time, but rather as defining a process through which transformation can occur.  Ingold 
is very keen to move away from an idea that spatial presence should be the defining 
identifier for ‘things’, towards an understanding of temporal transformation.  For Ingold 
things, be them humans or non human objects, can only be defined through their temporal 
patterns of unfolding, which he conceptualises as lines.  This is the life of the line, which the 
flu can end. 
 
To conceptualise life as lines is to place ourselves analytically in the midst of intersecting 
strands of activity and movement, made up of a range of different elements. For instance, 
one’s social media profile can be thought of as a line that moves from body through 
technology to other people. This is a non-representational theory of intersectionality, in 
which people as located individuals are not deemed to be communicating information about 
themselves through social media, but rather that digital activity forms lines of activity that 
intersect with other people’s online behaviour. This is what Ingold would call a meshwork; 
multiple lines of activity intersecting or entangling, which form the experience of our social 
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worlds. As Ingold notes, “[W]hen everything tangles with everything else, the result is what 
I call a meshwork. To describe the meshwork is to start from the premise that every living 
being is a line or, better, a bundle of lines”.5 Theoretically this is a shift away from thinking 
of life as formed through interactions and communications between preformed entities. For 
Ingold temporality is key, not spatiality.  Our traditional understanding of objects situated 
in the world that can communicate with one another, defined according to enduring spatial 
properties, is replaced with one that defines ‘things’ in terms of temporal lines. Movement, 
not stability, is of prime focus. 
 
“The theory of the assemblage, then, will not help us. It is too static, and it fails to 
answer the question of how the entities of which it is composed actually fasten to 
each other.”6 
 
Ingold is keen to move away from the increasingly popular concept of assemblage, which is 
featured in many areas of social and cultural theory, including affect studies.  The 
assemblage has been used to define a set of heterogenous elements coming together in a 
systematic way to effect a particular phenomenon.  For instance, Ringrose conceptualises 
young people’s social media activity in relation to gender and sexualized identities as an 
affective assemblage.7 Whilst Ingold has sympathy with the aims of the concept of 
assemblage, and it’s use in recent social cultural theory. He feels it is too spatial in its focus, 
and lacks a sense of temporal transformation.  Indeed, it has been pointed out that use of the 
English translation ‘assemblage’ tends to lose the vitality of the original concept agencment, 
which includes a greater sense of movement and agency.8 Instead of an assemblage, Ingold 
considers the ‘whole’ as a “correspondence, not an assemblage, the elements of which are 
joined not ‘up’ but ‘with’.9 Ingold draws on the metaphor of a rope, which is constituted 
through the interweaving of individual intersecting threads. It is this interweaving that 
Ingold refers to when stating that “knotting is the fundamental principle of coherence”.10 
Knotting, or interweaving, is what holds together lines that would otherwise be loose and 
formless. We can think of knowledge in this way, as much as material objects. Knotting lines 
are a valuable metaphor because they focus on temporal movement, rather than notions of 
fixity and stability. A considerable power though has developed for notions that attend to 
spatial, rather than temporal, metaphors. For instance, psychology has long developed into a 
discipline primarily concerned with conceptualising the ‘mind’ as a container, within which 
a number of cognitive factors exist that act as the “building blocks”11 of thought and 
behaviour.  
 
Sympathy and social media 
 
Ingold directs us to evaluate the ways that living ‘with’ works (or doesn’t), and how 
multiple lines can come to live with in meaningful ways. Ingold borrows from the design 
theorist Lars Spuybroek, the idea that to live with involves a sympathy, a mutual feeling of 
how things come together as intersecting patterns of movement. The human body is a prime 
example of the successful development of sympathy to function effectively. This idea of 
sympathy, a collective awareness of how certain lines fit together as part of a meaningful 
whole, is a potentially novel perspective through which to consider living in contemporary 
digitally mediated society, in which multiple forms of data collide and entangle. This 
includes information largely identifiable as individual activity (e.g. social media posts) as 
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well as other data that feed off and (re)configure online worlds of connectivity (e.g. what 
happens when ‘big’ and ‘small’ data combine). Here, the outdated demarcation between 
'real' and 'virtual' is proven fundamentally inadequate, through its frankly ridiculous 
theoretical simplicity. Meshworks captures notions of entanglement, movement and 
connection without requiring a theoretical distinction between human and digital in 
advance. Moreover, it provides a way of tracking how patterns of individuality and 
collectivity emerge in and as infospheres.12 In the next section I develop this work through 
Simondon’s concept of affectivity, to speak directly to the experience of living in 
infospheres, in which one exists simultaneously as ‘one and more than one’.  
 
Simondon and affectivity 
“[i]t becomes possible to think of the relation that is interior and exterior to the 
individual as participation, without referring to new substances”13 
“This same method may be used to explore affectivity and emotivity, which 
constitute the resonance of being in relation to itself, and which link the individuated 
being to the preindividual reality that is linked to it…..[T]he psychic is made of 
successive individuations that allow the being to resolve the problematic states that 
correspond to the permanent putting into communication of that which is larger and 
that which is smaller than it”14 
 
 
Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989) was a key influence on philosophies of technology (e.g. 
Stiegler) as well as broader 20th Century post-structuralist thought (e.g. Deleuze). For 
Simondon the idea of the subject is an ontogenetic one in which the role of individuality and 
collectivity are seen to interweave the conditions through which subjects emerge. This 
means that sociality emerges through processes in which ‘beings’ are not conceived as pre-
existing spatially distinct entities. This is what he means when talking of ‘the individual as 
participation’ in the quote above. Simondon’s theory of affectivity defines experience as 
‘more than one’, and as such, moves away from the traditional view of people as individual 
‘information processors’ driven and controlled by internal cognitive processes.  In its place 
he argued for an ontogentic understanding of the formation of multiple inter-related 
individuations. For Simondon, being precedes the individual, which is why he framed being 
as pre-individual, a realm through which individual life emerges. This is akin to notions of 
the virtual in Deleuze’s work.15 Of import here is a need to place “the individual into the 
system of reality in which the individuation occurs”.16 This led Simondon to frame a need to 
“know the individual through individuation, rather than the individuation through the 
individual".17  
 
The experience of being ‘more than one’, in relation to the reality of ‘carrying part of future 
collectives’, creates an affective tension which cannot be resolved solely at the individual 
level. The feeling of being partially collective is anxiety provoking, due to the difficulty of 
understanding the collective element of one’s being, which has not yet emerged, it is a 
future happening. This means that emotional activity cannot be easily captured, identified 
or manipulated. We are not made to feel by digital technologies, we feel with them. 
Therefore, we need to consider conditions of emergence, which means not starting with a 
notion of actualised emotional states ‘within’ individuals, but rather to look at the contextual 
conditions within which emotional activity unfolds. However, the environmental ‘half’ of 
the experience is not easily identifiable, and as such, involves being affected by an unknown 
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realm outside of immediate perception. Consequently, it is not possible to name or identify 
affectivity in a straightforward manner. Indeed, it is an experience that is not easily put into 
words. This though does not mean it can be detached from the “specific materiality of 
human bodies”18; a theoretical move made in much affect studies work on technologies. In a 
sense, it follows Bergson’s idea of claiming affect to have a definite human element, but 
without relying on reductionism to do so.19 Moreover, the emergence of actualised 
emotional activity does not exhaust pre-individuation. This is because, as Simondon notes, 
“that which individuation makes appear is not only the individual, but also the pair 
individual-environment”.20 Even when an individual actualises from pre-individuation it 
does not stop being partially collective. All individual bodies (human and non-human) carry 
something of future collectives with them, so are always potentialised for new 
individuations.21 This is why Simondon thought of being as ‘more than one’, because a 
complete individual is never fundamentally disconnected from wider collective activity, 
either in the present or future.  
 
Simondon’s concept of individuation does not rely on a pre-figured distinction between 
subject and object but rather focuses on them as parts of multi-layered processes, through 
which individual and collective life emerge.22 Crucially, this means that analytic focus shifts 
from talking about digital media as objects encroaching on psychological life, to processes of 
individuation that culminate in meta-stable individuations. This resonates with Mark 
Hansen’s point “that media impact the general sensibility of the world prior to and as a 
condition for impacting human experience”.23 Digital media play an increasingly active role 
in conditioning the environmental contexts of psychological life. Media act as the 
environmental ‘side’ of the ‘more than one’ reality of subjective life. Therefore, emotions are 
becoming with digital media rather than being controlled and dominated by them. This is a 
useful conceptual development because it provides a new perspective to digital media 
analysis in relation to affect and emotion. We see that living with digital media is by 
definition affective. Simondon’s concept of affectivity does not lose a notion of an individual 
psychological emotional experience at work. Indeed, it relies on it, albeit one that does not 
appoint a stable internal identity as productive of emotional activity. For Simondon, 
affectivity is fundamentally psycho-social.  
 
Becoming with digital media 
 
The argument of this chapter is that the pre-individual realms of modern societies are 
increasingly digitally mediated. Affectivity defines experience as always-already individual 
and social. These cannot be separated, meaning that all life is social.24 We are leaky bodies in 
relation to data with our porous bodies in continual transformation through moving in and 
through lines of affective individuation.25 These form into meshworks of entangled lines of 
body, data and technology. Simondon’s concept of affectivity captures the experience of 
being ‘more than one’.26 Ingold’s concept of lines focuses on movement and transformation 
through the speed27 of meshworks of bodies and data, affectivity focuses attention on the 
psychological part of such events. This is not about an individual emotional cognitive 
process but rather a broader way of becoming as part of systems of reality that are multi-
layered, spatially and temporally. No one can see the future lines of individuation one’s data 
will become. Some may ‘feed forward’28 into recognizable future patterns of activity. Others 
may contribute to information societies in ways we will never know or see. To return to the 
example of the NHS flu campaign stating that the illness can be the end of the line. On the 
face of it, this makes sense. However, in relation to living in heavily digitally mediated 
worlds, it is possible to think that a philosophy of individuation and affectivity opens up the 
idea that even when the biological body stops moving, informational activity will continue 
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to shape future collectives and meshworks. This is an age when people have to consider 
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